Evidence accumulation detected in BOLD signal using slow perceptual decision making by Krueger, Paul M. et al.
  
 University of Groningen
Evidence accumulation detected in BOLD signal using slow perceptual decision making
Krueger, Paul M.; van Vugt, Marieke K.; Simen, Patrick; Nystrom, Leigh; Holmes, Philip;
Cohen, Jonathan D.
Published in:
Journal of Neuroscience Methods
DOI:
10.1016/j.jneumeth.2017.01.012
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Final author's version (accepted by publisher, after peer review)
Publication date:
2017
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Krueger, P. M., van Vugt, M. K., Simen, P., Nystrom, L., Holmes, P., & Cohen, J. D. (2017). Evidence
accumulation detected in BOLD signal using slow perceptual decision making. Journal of Neuroscience
Methods, 281, 21-32. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jneumeth.2017.01.012
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
                             Elsevier Editorial System(tm) for Journal of 
Neuroscience Methods 
                                  Manuscript Draft 
 
 
Manuscript Number: JNEUMETH-D-16-00380R2 
 
Title: Evidence accumulation detected in BOLD signal using slow 
perceptual decision making  
 
Article Type: Research Paper 
 
Section/Category: Computational Neuroscience 
 
Keywords: Evidence accumulation; Drift-diffusion model; Decision making; 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging 
 
Corresponding Author: Mr. Paul Krueger,  
 
Corresponding Author's Institution: University of California, Berkeley 
 
First Author: Paul Krueger 
 
Order of Authors: Paul Krueger; Marieke K van Vugt, PhD; Patrick Simen, 




We assessed whether evidence accumulation could be observed in the BOLD 
signal during perceptual decision making. This presents a challenge since 





Guided by theoretical predictions of the drift diffusion model, we slowed 
down decisions by penalizing participants for incorrect responses. 
Second, we distinguished BOLD activity related to stimulus detection 
(modeled using a boxcar) from activity related to integration (modeled 
using a ramp) by minimizing the collinearity of GLM regressors.  This was 
achieved by dissecting a boxcar into its two most orthogonal components: 
an "up-ramp" and a "down-ramp." Third, we used a control condition in 
which stimuli and responses were similar to the experimental condition, 




The results revealed an absence of areas in parietal cortex that have 
been proposed to drive perceptual decision making but have recently come 
into question; and newly identified regions that are candidates for 
involvement in evidence accumulation. 
 
 
Comparison with Existing Methods 
 
Previous fMRI studies have either used fast perceptual decision making, 
which precludes the measurement of evidence accumulation, or slowed down 
responses by gradually revealing stimuli. The latter approach confounds 
perceptual detection with evidence accumulation because accumulation is 




We slowed down the decision making process itself while leaving 
perceptual information intact. This provided a more sensitive and 
selective observation of brain regions associated with the evidence 
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• Measuring evidence accumulation with fMRI is challenging because the BOLD signal 
is slow 
• We protracted evidence accumulation using predictions of the drift-diffusion model 
• We minimized collinearity of regressors to distinguish ramping and “boxcar” activity 








We assessed whether evidence accumulation could be observed in the BOLD signal during 
perceptual decision making. This presents a challenge since the hemodynamic response is slow, 




Guided by theoretical predictions of the drift diffusion model, we slowed down decisions by 
penalizing participants for incorrect responses. Second, we distinguished BOLD activity related 
to stimulus detection (modeled using a boxcar) from activity related to integration (modeled 
using a ramp) by minimizing the collinearity of GLM regressors.  This was achieved by 
dissecting a boxcar into its two most orthogonal components: an “up-ramp” and a “down-ramp.” 
Third, we used a control condition in which stimuli and responses were similar to the 




The results revealed an absence of areas in parietal cortex that have been proposed to drive 
perceptual decision making but have recently come into question; and newly identified regions 
that are candidates for involvement in evidence accumulation.	
	
	
Comparison with Existing Methods	
	
Previous fMRI studies have either used fast perceptual decision making, which precludes the 
measurement of evidence accumulation, or slowed down responses by gradually revealing 
stimuli. The latter approach confounds perceptual detection with evidence accumulation because 




We slowed down the decision making process itself while leaving perceptual information intact. 
This provided a more sensitive and selective observation of brain regions associated with the 
evidence accumulation processes underlying perceptual decision making than previous methods.	
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The neural correlates of perceptual decision making have been studied extensively using monkey 
neurophysiology (e.g., Gold & Shadlen, 2000) and human electroencephalography (EEG; e.g., 
van Vugt, Simen, Nystrom, Holmes & Cohen, 2012), magnetoencephalography (MEG; e.g., 
Donner, Siegel, Fries, & Engel, 2009), and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI; e.g., 
H. R. Heekeren, Marrett, Ruff, Bandettini, & Ungerleider, 2006; Wheeler et al., 2015; see 
Mulder, Van Maanen, & Forstmann, 2014, for a meta analysis). In comparison to the other 
methods, the temporal resolution of fMRI (on the order of 2 seconds) is very slow—too slow, in 
fact, to capture the sub-second time course of most perceptual decisions. Nevertheless, it has 
been the neuroimaging method of choice used to distinguish which brain regions are involved in 
perceptual decisions in humans (e.g. Heekeren et al., 2006; Ploran et al., 2007; Ivanoff, 
Branning, and Marois, 2008; Tosoni, Galati, Romani, and Corbetta, 2008; Basten, Biele, 
Heekeren, and Fiebach, 2010; Ploran, Tremel, Nelson, and Wheeler, 2011; Gluth, Rieskamp, & 
Büchel, 2012).	
 
The dynamics of the decision making process are typically described by models of evidence 
accumulation such as the drift diffusion model (DDM; Ratcliff, 1978), linear ballistic 
accumulator (Brown & Heathcote, 2008), or leaky competing accumulators (Usher & 
McClelland, 2001). These models posit that in order to make simple decisions, people 
accumulate noisy evidence supporting competing alternatives until the evidence in favor of one 
reaches a decision threshold. The noisiness of the evidence and the amount of drift favoring a 
particular alternative represent the quality of the signal on which the decision is based, or the 
difficulty of the task. The threshold is used to model a participant’s speed-accuracy tradeoff, with 
higher thresholds representing more cautious decisions.	
 
There have been several approaches to investigating the neural correlates of evidence 
accumulation using fMRI. Some have argued that neural correlates of evidence accumulation 
should be effector-specific, while others have argued the opposite. In the first camp, Tosoni, 
Galati, Romani, and Corbetta (2008) found increases in BOLD activity in precuneus, medial 
parietal lobe, posterior parietal reach region, precentral gyrus and sensorimotor cortex for button 
press responses, whereas saccade responses elicited more activation in the posterior intra-parietal 
sulcus and the frontal eye field. Only a subset of these areas showed activation that was 
modulated by the amount of sensory evidence that was accumulated. Other studies have focused 
on non-effector-specific responses. For example, Heekeren et al. (2006) found that a large 
number of areas including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and inferior parietal lobe 
(IPL) showed activity consistent with evidence accumulation. In a study of value-based decision 
making, Basten, Biele, Heekeren, and Fiebach (2010) used individual differences in each 
participant’s drift rate in addition to modulation by task difficulty to identify clusters in 
intraparietal sulcus as neural correlates of evidence accumulation. A problem with these 
approaches is that due to the slow nature of fMRI blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) 
activity, it confounds evidence accumulation with several other processes that occur 
simultaneously, such as perceptual processing and motor preparation.	
 
Another approach to studying evidence accumulation has been to slow down the decision such 
that it can be tracked even with the sluggish BOLD response. For example, Ploran et al. (2007) 
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and Ploran, Tremel, Nelson, and Wheeler (2011) gradually revealed perceptual evidence used by 
participants to determine object identity. They found that BOLD activity in inferior frontal, 
temporal, and parietal regions showed a progressive increase in agreement with a model of 
gradual accumulation of evidence. Using a similar discontinuous stream of evidence, Gluth, 
Rieskamp, & Büchel (2012) showed that in a value-based decision task, the supplementary 
motor area, caudate nucleus and anterior insula tracked the amount of collected evidence. 
Ivanoff, Branning, and Marois (2008) also slowed down responses by gradually increasing the 
amount of visible evidence in a random dot motion task over the course of each trial. They 
examined the dynamics of evidence accumulation in a set of ROIs obtained from an easy motion 
discrimination localizer task. They found that in lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) and 
supplementary motor area (SMA) activity increased with accumulated evidence, and this region 
also discriminated between speed- and accuracy conditions. 	
 
All of these paradigms are potentially problematic, however, in that they slowed the 
accumulation process by manipulating the availability of evidence (i.e., slowly strengthening the 
stimulus or gradually revealing it).  This progressive increase in the availability of evidence 
could have induced a progressive increase in the activity of regions responsible for visual 
perception, without reflecting the operation of an integration process at later cognitive stages (as 
discussed in more detail below). Thus, these designs introduce a potential confound between 
perceptual detection and integration because decision making is constrained by the availability of 
perceptual information rather than the accumulation of already-available information. This 
makes it difficult to dissociate these two subprocesses of decision making.	
 
Here, we suggest an alternative approach to observing the evidence accumulation process in 
fMRI, based on a theoretical prediction from the DDM. The DDM predicts that it should 
possible to dramatically slow down the decision process itself — without interfering with 
stimulus input — by modifying the speed-accuracy trade-off.  As suggested by both Bogacz et 
al. (2006) and Balci et al. (2011), if participants are seeking to maximize their reward rates and 
therefore their total earnings, optimality analysis of decision behavior reveals that it should be 
possible to slow down responses by imposing penalties for incorrect responses (we provide an 
explanation for this effect in greater detail below). This offers a more ecologically valid way to 
protract evidence accumulation, without manipulating or otherwise impacting the availability of 
evidence from the stimulus.	
 
We conducted an experiment to test whether we could slow down the decision process in this 
way, and use this to measure the neural correlates of the integration component. Participants 
performed a random dot motion task (Britten, Shadlen, Newsome, & Movshon, 1992), in which 
every correct answer was rewarded with one cent, while they incurred a penalty of two cents for 
every incorrect response. This resulted in a dramatic increase of response times, making it 
possible to disentangle signals related to different subprocesses in decision making using fMRI. 
We compared regressors designed to distinguish ramping activity from “boxcar” activity (van 
Vugt et al., 2012). By further comparing activity between the decision task and a control task 
that did not engage a perceptual evidence accumulation process, we identified brain regions 
involved in perceptual evidence accumulation unconfounded by stimulus factors, that included 
bilateral anterior insula, cerebellum, caudate, frontal gyrus, and higher visual areas.	
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2. Materials and Methods	
 
2.1. Motion Discrimination task	
 
Participants engaged in a visual decision making task in which they judged the net direction 
(leftward or rightward) of a cloud of randomly moving dots (Fig. 1A), indicating responses 
bimanually with a button box. Each trial began with the onset of moving dots, and participants 
were free to respond at any time. After making a decision, participants were given feedback 
indicating whether they answered correctly or not, and the running total number of points earned. 	
 
The random dot kinematograms were similar to those used in a series of psychophysical and 
decision making experiments involving monkeys (e.g., Britten et al., 1992; Gold & Shadlen, 
2001; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001) and humans (e.g. Simen et al., 2009; Balci et al., 2011) as 
participants. Stimuli consisted of an aperture of an approximately 3 inch diameter viewed from 
approximately 100 cm (approximately 4 degrees visual angle) in which white dots (2 x 2 pixels) 
moved on a black background. A subset of dots moved coherently either to the left or to the right 
on each trial, whereas the remainder of dots were distractors that jumped randomly from frame to 
frame. Motion coherence was defined as the percentage of coherently moving dots. Dot density 
was 17 dots/square degree, selected so that individual dots could not easily be tracked. The 
experiment presentation code was written in PsychToolbox (Brainard, 1997). Dots were 
presented with PsychToolbox extensions written by J. I. Gold (http://code.google.com/p/dotsx/).	
 
	
Fig. 1. Moving dots task. (A): A single trial from the experimental condition. After a brief fixation cross, a circular 
patch of moving dots appeared onscreen.  Most of the dots moved in random directions, but a small subset of dots 
moved coherently in a single direction (left or right).  Participants freely responded with bimanual button presses to 
indicate which direction they thought the coherent dots were moving, at which point feedback appeared onscreen, 
indicating whether they were correct and the running total of points. (B): A trial from the control condition. 
Participants viewed randomly moving dots (with zero coherence) that they were told to ignore, and were then cued 
by an arrow to respond left or right. The onset of the arrow was timed such that the distribution of dots motion 
viewing times was the same as the experimental condition.	
 
We calibrated the motion coherence for each participant individually, so that they performed at 
approximately 75% and 85% correct for low and high coherence stimuli, respectively. Before the 
neuroimaging experiment, participants were trained for 1–4 behavioral sessions until they were 
familiar with the task, and their performance was consistently in the target range of 75% and 
85% percent correct. Both behavioral-only and fMRI sessions consisted of three ~20-minute runs 
of four 4.5-minute blocks each, with a 30-second break between blocks. Participants could do as 
many trials as they desired in each block, but were encouraged to maximize the points they 
earned over the course of each block. Maximizing points therefore depended both on the number 
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of trials performed and their accuracy. To prevent anticipatory responses and to facilitate 
deconvolution of the BOLD signal, the response-to-stimulus interval between each trial was 
drawn from a gamma distribution with a mean of ten seconds, a standard deviation of one 
second, and a skewness of 0.5.	
 
2.2. Slowing down decision time	
 
Participants were paid one cent for every correct response, but they lost two cents for every 
incorrect response. To ensure they would not end up with a negative balance, every participant 
was given a starting credit of $5. Theoretical analyses (Bogacz et al., 2006; Balci et al., 2011) 
predicted that introduction of this penalty should cause participants to slow down dramatically. If 
responses are slowed down on the order of several seconds, this should allow for analysis of 
accumulation dynamics, even after their convolution with the time course of the BOLD signal.	
 
The theoretical analysis used to slow down response times is based on evidence that participants 
try to maximize their reward rate in tasks of this type (Balci et al. 2011; Bogacz et al., 2010; 
Simen et al., 2009; Starns & Ratcliff, 2010). Participants’ reward rates are determined by a 
tradeoff between responding quickly and responding accurately. Without penalties imposed for 
errors, the expected reward rate (RR) is the proportion of correct responses divided by the 
average time between them (Bogacz et al., 2006):	
 
[Eq. 1]     RR = 1−ERDT +T0 + RSI
	
	
where ER, the error rate, is the proportion of incorrect responses, and the terms in the 
denominator sum up to the total time between trials (DT, the decision time, is the period of 
evidence accumulation; T0, the non-decision time, is the fraction of the response time with no 
evidence accumulation, e.g., to execute a motor response; RSI, the response-to-stimulus interval, 
is the time between trials). The optimal decision time as a function of error rate is given by the 
DDM as:	
 
















where the term on the left is the normalized decision time (Dtotal = T0 + RSI). If participants are 
penalized for incorrect responses, then the modified expected reward rate is (Bogacz et al. 2006):	
 





where q is the penalty for incorrect responses. The optimal normalized decision time becomes:	
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[Eq. 4]     DTDtotal


















Figure 2 shows optimal performance curves produced by Equation 4. When no penalties are 
imposed (blue curve), the optimal decision time is small relative to the total decision time 
(DTtotal). When penalties for errors are larger than rewards for correct responses, the optimal 
decision time increases dramatically (purple and green curves), and becomes unbounded at error 
rates below 50% (Balci et al., 2011) (when the penalty/reward ratio is 2.0, optimal decision times 
become unbounded as error rates approach approx. 20.8% (green curve); when the ratio is 1.5, 
decision times become unbounded as error rates approach approx. 31.0% (purple curve)).	
 
Whether the predicted, protracted process of evidence accumulation is likely to occur in the brain 
is an open question. An influential claim has been made that the DDM only accurately models 
decision processes lasting one second or less (e.g., Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998). Despite this 
interpretation, the DDM has been shown to give a compelling account of data with much longer 
response times (e.g., Simen, Vlasov & Papadakis, 2016). Nevertheless, Ratcliff & Rouder (1998) 
conjecture that, good fit or bad, response times longer than a second probably reflect final 
decisions consisting of sequences of failed micro-decisions. Under this conjecture, each micro-
decision fails to produce a final choice. Instead, the final decision is produced by aggregating 
micro-decisions or it is based solely on the outcome of the last micro-decision. In either case, 
accumulator regions would be expected to show sequences of ramps that reset to their starting 
points many times within each completed decision, contrary to our assumption of a single, 
shallow ramp. Note that micro-decision aggregation might itself produce a crucial accumulation 
process in difficult decisions such as the ones we investigate here. In any case, we demonstrate 
that assuming a single, protracted diffusion process for each decision leads to behavior and 
model fits with properties predicted by the reward-rate optimality hypothesis, which could easily 
have been disconfirmed by the data. Using this method to infer which brain areas are involved in 
evidence accumulation therefore seems as reasonable as modifying the stimulus to delay decision 
making as was done by Ploran et al. (2007) and Gluth et al. (2012). 
 
	
Fig. 2. Penalties for incorrect responses drastically increase the optimal decision time. Each curve shows the 
normalized decision time that maximizes reward rate, as a function of error, as predicted by the drift-diffusion 
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model. When penalties for incorrect responses are small relative to rewards for correct responses (blue and red 
curves), then the optimal normalized decision time is always less than one. When penalties are large relative to 
rewards (purple and green curves), then the optimal decision time increases dramatically. This theoretical prediction 




We used a control task in which no evidence accumulation of moving dots could take place, but 
participants still viewed comparable visual input and gave responses as they did in the 
experimental condition (Fig. 1B). Each control trial started with random dot motion (with 0% 
coherence), followed by a yellow arrow (approximately 2 x 2 inches, located in the center of the 
screen) indicating the direction to which a participant should respond. The arrow onset time was 
calibrated such that the dot motion viewing times (measured from dots onset to button press) 
from these “arrows” trials mirrored the response times of the preceding motion discrimination 
block (with coherence greater than 0%). This task therefore controlled for low-level visual input, 
dot kinematogram viewing times, and motor responding, while eliminating evidence 
accumulation for coherent dot movement.  During every 20-minute run, each 4.5-minute block of 
the motion discrimination task was followed by a block of the control task. For shorthand, we 
often refer to the control task as the “arrows” task, and the motion discrimination task as the 
“dots” task.	
	
We use the term “dot motion viewing time,” or “viewing time” for short, to refer to the duration 
from the onset of dots to button press. The term “response time” can equivalently be used for the 
dots task; however, for the arrows task, “response time” is inaccurate since participants are 
passively viewing dots, and responding to the onset of the arrow. Therefore, “dot motion viewing 




We recruited a total of 30 participants (13 females, mean age: 22.7, range: 17.5-38.4). 10 
participants were removed from the experiment because they failed to finish the pre-fMRI 
behavioral training sessions (9) or fell asleep in the scanner (1). Participants were recruited from 
the Princeton community and paid $20 per hour, plus a performance bonus based on the number 
of points they acquired during the experimental task. The experiment was approved by the 
Institutional Review Board of Princeton University.	
 
2.5. DDM model fits	
 
We used the DMA toolbox (VandeKerckhove & Tuerlinckx, 2007, 2008) to fit the DDM to the 
behavioral data. We allowed only drift rate to vary between conditions, since our design only 
varied stimulus coherence which primarily affects drift rate (e.g., Balci et al., 2011; Ratcliff, 
2002; van Vugt et al., 2012). This was the best-fitting model using a BIC test for 12/20 
participants (when comparing the following models: only drift varies; drift and threshold vary; 
and drift, threshold and non-decision time vary with coherence condition). The remaining 8 
participants were equally split between the model that included only the threshold, and the one 
that included both threshold and non-decision time. We removed all RTs longer than 25 seconds 
prior to fitting the DDM to the behavioral data. This outlier removal rule affected data from only 
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a minority of the participants, with an average of 1.4 outlier trials per participant out of an 
average 60 trials total (around 2%). For the purpose of fitting the DDM, it is worth noting that 
our participants make errors, which allow us to constrain the parameter fits with both correct and 
error RT distributions. Despite the long RTs in our experiment, we were able to calibrate the 
error rate by manipulating the stimulus coherence, as described in section 2.1.	
 
2.6. Data acquisition and preprocessing	
 
Scanning was performed on a 3 Tesla Siemens (Munich, Germany) Allegra scanner. First an 
anatomical scan with voxel size 1 x 0.5 x 0.5 mm was acquired using an MPRAGE sequence. 
Subsequently, whole brain, BOLD-weighted echo-planar images were acquired parallel to the 
anterior commissure-posterior commissure line with a repetition time of 2 seconds and echo time 
of 30 milliseconds while participants performed the task. These images consisted of 64 x 64 x 34 
voxels, 3 x 3 x 4 mm in size. We used AFNI (Cox, 1996) to preprocess the fMRI data. 
Functional images were first aligned to correct for head movement during the scan. Slice timing 
correction was then performed using sine interpolation. Images were subsequently normalized to 
Montreal Neurological Institute coordinates (the TT_N27 template) and resampled at 3 x 3 x 3 
mm3 resolution. A Gaussian smoothing kernel of 4 mm full-width at half-maximum (FWHM) 
was applied to improve comparison across subjects, and finally, all time series were scaled to 
have a mean signal value of 100. Head movement estimates derived from the first realignment 
step were included as regressors in all analyses to help diminish the impact of any movement-
related effects on the results.	
 
2.7. General linear model	
 
We performed a multiple linear regression that was designed to distinguish two component 
processes involved in perceptual decision making: detection and integration. A (motion) detector 
was defined as an area of the brain expected to be active at a more or less constant level 
throughout the decision process. We modeled such neural activity as a boxcar function that 
turned on at stimulus onset (i.e. onset of moving dots) and turned off at the button press (Fig. 
3A). An integrator was defined as an area of the brain in which activation was expected to build 
up more or less constantly throughout the decision process when stimuli were presented 
continuously. We modeled such neural activity as a ramp that started from zero at stimulus onset 
and rose linearly until the button press, at which point it dropped back to zero (Fig. 3B). This 
assumption corresponds more closely to the linear ballistic accumulator (LBA) model of Brown 
and Heathcote (2008) than to the diffusion model, since it replaces the random-walk trajectory of 
a diffusion process with a straight line (see e.g., Ho, Brown & Serences, 2009). However, this 
assumption was necessary for our GLM analyses, since there is no behavioral signature of the 
diffusion process other than its termination time and the choice it selects. This assumption was 
partially justified by the low-pass-filter property of the BOLD signal, which would in any case 
tend to linearize a noisy process of ramping neural activity. 	
 
Ramp and boxcar regressors display collinearity, however, and the correlation between the two 
increases substantially when convolved with the low-pass hemodynamic response function (Fig. 
3D & E). Using such regressors would limit the reliability of model fits and the interpretability 
of results because of the ambiguity between the two: areas of the brain that fit well to the ramp 
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regressor may still largely display boxcar-like activity, and vice versa.  In order to minimize the 
collinearity between regressors while still distinguishing detection and integration, we used two 
distinct regressors: an up-ramp, as before, and a non-up-ramp component of a boxcar, which 
looks like a “down-ramp”: activity goes from zero to one at stimulus onset and ramps down to 
zero at the button press (Fig. 3C). Thus, the sum of the up-ramp regressor and the down-ramp 
regressor is exactly a boxcar (we thank Jack Grinband [personal communication] for suggesting 
this approach). Using this scheme, true ramping activation is detected where the goodness of fit 
of the up-ramp regressor is significantly greater than that of the down-ramp regressor; if the 
difference is not significant, we conclude that the activation does not unambiguously support the 
hypothesis of ramping. Thus, the down-ramp alone may not necessarily model BOLD activity, 
but when used in concert with an up-ramp improves our ability to distinguish upward-ramping 
activity from boxcar activity.	
 
 
Fig. 3. Regressor types. The column on the left shows three types of regressors: (A) a boxcar function, (B) an up-
ramp, and (C) a down-ramp. These example regressors are for a trial with a viewing time of 10 seconds. The column 
on the right (D, E, F)  shows these same regressors after being convolved with the hemodynamic response function. 
We used only up-ramp and down-ramp regressors in order to minimize collinearity and thereby reliably distinguish 
ramping activity from boxcar activity.  
	
Fig. 4 illustrates that collinearity between regressors can be minimized by using up-ramp and 
down-ramp regressors instead of up-ramp and boxcar regressors, as well as by extending viewing 
times. Collinearity is measured using the condition number (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsh, 1980), 
which in this case is the ratio of singular values of the matrix containing each pair of regressors. 
A smaller condition number indicates less collinearity.  The condition number of a single up-
ramp (as in Fig. 3B) and a single boxcar (as in Fig. 3A) is 3.73, and does not vary depending on 
the length of the trial (dotted black line in Fig. 4). The condition number of an up-ramp and a 
down-ramp (as in Fig. 3C) is 1.73 (dotted red line in Fig. 4). When these regressors are 
convolved with the low-pass hemodynamic response function, the collinearity increases overall, 
but approaches that of the un-convolved regressors as the trial length increases (solid lines). The 
black solid curve shows the condition number of a convolved up-ramp (as in Fig. 3E) and a 
convolved boxcar (as in Fig. 3D). The red solid curve shows the condition number of a 
convolved up-ramp (as in Fig. 3E) and a convolved down-ramp (as in Fig. 3F). Note that the 
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example regressors shown in Fig. 3 are for a trial with a viewing time of 10 seconds. With 
shorter viewing times, the discernibility of the convolved regressors diminishes.	
 
Using down-ramp regressors instead of boxcars substantially decreases collinearity, thereby 
improving our ability to reliably detect ramping BOLD activity. Furthermore, extending viewing 
times has two advantages: 1) it decreases the collinearity of convolved regressors, further 
improving our ability to reliably detect ramping activity (Fig. 4); and 2) it makes it possible to 
measure ramping activity directly despite the low temporal resolution of fMRI (our data were 
acquired at 2 seconds per sample).	
	
To account for the possibility that response-related activity may be mistaken for accumulation, 
we fit an additional GLM. In this GLM, we added a stick-function regressor at the time of 
responding to account for decision-related increases in BOLD that would be expected to occur 
near the time of responding, which could be mistaken for ramping. This analysis, however, made 
a negligible difference to any of our results. We also visually inspected the timeseries data from 
each ROI, and found that the BOLD signal showed a pattern of ramping consistent with constant 
accumulation (Fig. S4). 
 
	
Fig. 4. Collinearity is minimized by using down-ramps instead of boxcar functions, and by having longer response 
times. The collinearity between a single unconvolved up-ramp (like that seen in Fig. 3B) and an unconvolved boxcar 
(as in Fig. 3A) is shown as a dotted black line. The collinearity between an unconvolved up-ramp and an 
unconvolved down-ramp (as in Fig. 3C) is lower (dotted red line). When these same regressors are convolved with 
the hemodynamic response function (as shown in the right column of Fig. 3), the collinearity increases. However, 
collinearity decreases as a function of viewing time. The solid black curve shows the collinearity between a single 
convolved up-ramp and a convolved boxcar. The solid red curve shows the collinearity between a convolved up-
ramp and a convolved down-ramp, which is much lower.	
 
In summary, our experimental paradigm had three key features that allowed us to measure 
perceptual evidence accumulation: 1) penalties for incorrect responses which dramatically 
slowed down response times and yielded relatively high accuracy despite low signal-to-noise 
ratios in the stimuli; 2) a control task with matched stimulus viewing times in which no dot-
motion integration takes place, since the button press depends on the direction of a yellow arrow 
and not on dot motion; and 3) the use of regressors that allow us to measure ramping activation 
that is minimally confounded with boxcar activation. The underlying methodological challenge 


























with measuring evidence accumulation using fMRI is the sluggishness of the BOLD response 
and the poor temporal resolution of fMRI. The combination of 1) & 3) allowed us to leverage an 
unprecedented degree of discrimination between ramping activation and boxcar activation. The 
use of 2) allowed us to also distinguish ramping activation that associated with evidence 
accumulation for the dot motion stimuli per se from that which is involved more generally 
during manual response preparation.	
 
For each participant we fit the convolved up-ramp and down-ramp regressors to the voxel-wise 
BOLD fMRI data (with third-order polynomial baseline detrending on each twenty-minute 
scanner run) using multiple linear regression (AFNI’s 3dDeconvolve). In total, our GLM had ten 
regressors for each participant: the up-ramp for the experimental motion discrimination (“dots”) 
trials, the up-ramp for the control condition (“arrows”) trials, the down-ramp for dots trials, the 
down-ramp for arrows trials, and six standard motion-correction regressors. To correct for 
multiple comparisons, we first estimated the spatial autocorrelation function (ACF) for each 
participant’s residuals left over from the GLM (AFNI’s 3dFWHMx). This ACF was fit to a 
mixture model of Gaussian plus mono-exponential. We then used the group mean ACF 
parameters to estimate the probability of false positives (using the most recent version of AFNI’s 
3dClustSim; Cox, Reynolds, & Taylor, 2016). We set a voxelwise threshold of p < 0.001 and a 
corrected threshold of p < 0.01 with bi-sided and face/edge nearest neighbor clustering 
parameters.	
 
Using four parameter estimates (beta-weights) per participant from the GLM (up-ramp for dots 
condition, up-ramp for arrows condition, down-ramp for dots condition, and down-ramp for 
arrows condition), we performed a voxel-wise ANOVA with three factors: task type (dots 
condition vs. arrows condition), ramp regressor type (up-ramps vs. down-ramps), and 
participants (modeled as random effects; AFNI’s 3dANOVA3). We identified voxels for which 
there was a significant main effect of condition on beta-weights, and an interaction between 
condition and ramp regressor type on beta-weights (each at p < 0.001, corrected). For areas 
involved in integration, the difference between beta weights for dots trials and arrows trials 
should be positive, and the interaction between trial type and ramp regressor type should be such 
that the difference between beta-weights for up-ramp regressors and down-ramp regressors is 
more positive for dots trials than for arrows trials. This would indicate significant upward 
ramping activity that is more significant for the decision making task than for the control task.	
 
We also tested for voxels for which there was a significant increase in beta-weights from the 
arrows task to the dots task (measured using the difference in beta-weights between the dots task 
and arrows task, collapsed across ramp regressor type, at p < 0.001, corrected). These areas 
should be involved in the decision making process, although not necessarily involved in evidence 
accumulation. Within these areas, those involved in evidence accumulation should show a 
greater difference between beta weights for up-ramp regressors and down-ramp regressors for 
the dots task than for the arrows task, and overlap with regions found in the previous analysis. 








Before turning to the neuroimaging results, we first discuss effects related to the behavioral 
manipulations. Fig. 5A shows that participants had an average response time of 10.1 seconds for 
the low coherence condition and 7.2 seconds for the high coherence condition, indicating that we 
succeeded in slowing participants down dramatically from typical performance without penalties 
(on the order of 1 second). Participants had an average error rate of 26% for the low coherence 
condition, and 15% for the high coherence condition (Fig. 5B). The average coherence levels 




Fig. 5. Behavioral data for motion discrimination averaged across participants, with error-bars indicating the 
standard error of the mean.  (A) response times for the high coherence level and the low coherence level (mean 10.1 
and 7.2, respectively) and (B) the proportion of incorrect responses for high coherence low coherence trials (0.26 
and 0.15, respectively). (C) The low coherence level and the high coherence level were calibrated for each 
participant to correspond to an error rate of about 25% and 15%, respectively.  The average coherence (i.e. the 
percentage of dots moving in one direction) was 3.8% for the low coherence level and 7.6% for the high coherence 
level.  	
 
Fig. 6 visualizes the relation between dot motion viewing times in the experimental and control 
conditions, with each point reflecting the dot motion viewing time and the two-dimensional 
standard error of the mean for that participant. It is easy to see that dot motion viewing times 
were well-matched between the experimental condition (in which participants made perceptual 
























































Fig. 6. Dot motion viewing times were matched between the control condition and the experimental condition. Each 
data point represents the mean dot motion viewing time for a single participant in the motion discrimination task and 
the control task, with error-bars indicating the standard error of the mean for that participant for the control 
condition (vertical error-bars) and the experimental condition (horizontal error-bars).	
 
We fit the DDM to each participant’s behavioral data in order to assess whether this model could 
provide a good fit of the data in our task, and examine the model parameters. Table 1 shows the 
estimates of the drift parameter (note: the DMAT fitting algorithm sets the DDM noise parameter 
to 0.1, following conventions established by Ratcliff and colleagues). As expected, the drift rate 
for low coherence trials is lower than for high coherence trials [t(19) = -6.03, p < 0.001]. The 
thresholds do not differ between conditions because those were held fixed (see Methods). Note 
that these threshold values are extremely high, relative to typical DDM-fits in experiments 
without penalties (0.15 is common), and that drift values are relatively low (16% and 36% of the 
noise parameter value of 0.1, whereas 100% or greater is more typical). These results suggest 
that our low motion coherence and penalty-for-errors manipulation succeeded in boosting DDM 
decision thresholds to unusually high levels. Such high thresholds yield reasonable accuracy 
even with low motion coherences, and as a by-product, produce the unusually long response 
times we sought to induce. Non-decision time estimates are generally expected to be much less 
than 500 msec (usually in the 200-300 msec range), and therefore constitute a small proportion 
of the full response times we observed (much smaller than in typical data sets with one-second 
response times). That the fitting algorithm converged on an estimate of 0 for these parameters is 





mean	 standard	error	 mean	 standard	error	
drift	 0.016	 0.002	 0.036	 0.005	
threshold	 0.57	 0.02	 0.57	 0.02	
non-decision	time	(sec)	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Table 1.  Drift Diffusion Model parameter estimates.  For each parameter, the mean and standard error across 
participants is shown for low coherence trials and high coherence trials. The very low estimates for non-decision 
times likely reflect the fact that estimates of these are generally in the sub-second range, which represents a 
substantially smaller fraction of the unusually long decision times in this dataset. Nevertheless, fits give quite a 
reasonable description of the response time distributions (see Fig. S1 for an assessment of model fit quality by 





Our fMRI analysis used up-ramp and down-ramp regressors, the length of which were 
determined by the dot motion viewing time for each trial, convolved with the hemodynamic 
response function. The collinearity of regressors for each participant is shown as red crosses in 
Fig. 7 (each cross shows the collinearity for one participant). Had we used boxcars instead of 
down-ramps, the collinearity would have been considerably higher (black crosses). In either 
case, the collinearity tends to decrease as the mean viewing time for each participant increases. 
For comparison, the collinearity between these regressors for a single pair of unconvolved 
regressors (dashed lines) and a single pair of convolved regressors (solid curves) is shown, just 
as in Figure 4. The collinearity of regressors for actual participants is lower than the solid curves 
because there are several regressors for each participant that are jittered with a variable response-
to-stimulus interval. Figures S6 – S8 (Supplementary section) compare GLM results for using 
up-ramp and down-ramp regressors versus up-ramp and boxcar regressors.	
	
	
Fig. 7. Collinearity of actual regressors. Each cross shows the collinearity of regressors for one participant, plotted 
against each participant’s mean dot motion viewing time. The collinearity of up-ramp and down-ramp regressors 
(red crosses), which were used in our analysis, is less than that of up-ramp and boxcar regressors (black crosses). 
The regressors of participants with longer mean viewing times tended to be somewhat less collinear. For 
comparison, the dotted lines and solid curves show the collinearity for single unconvolved and convolved regressors, 
respectively, just as in Fig. 4.	
 
We used two criteria to identify areas of the brain involved in evidence accumulation: 1) 
parameter estimates (beta-weights) must be significantly greater during the perceptual decision 
making task (“dots” task) than the control task in which participants viewed randomly moving 
dots and responded to an arrow (“arrows” task); and 2) parameter estimates must be significantly 
greater for the up-ramp regressor than for the down-ramp regressor, which is indicative of true 
ramping activity (see Methods). We performed a three-factor repeated measures ANOVA on 
beta-weights from our GLM analysis, with task type (dots vs. arrows), ramp regressor type (up-
ramp vs. down ramp), and participants (modeled as random effects) as our factors (see Methods). 
Fig. 8 shows areas for which: 1) there was a main effect of task type, and 2) there was an 
interaction between task type and ramp regressor type (each at a threshold of p < 0.01, 
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corrected). Table 2 shows the name, voxel size, and center-of-mass location of all fourteen 
clusters.	
 
To explore the nature of these interactions, Fig. 9 shows the beta-weights for each cluster, 
averaged across participants, with error bars indicating the standard error of the mean across 
participants. In all of these clusters, it turned out that the beta-weights were greater in the dots 
task than in the arrows task (collapsed across ramp regressor type), and that the difference 
between beta-weights for the up-ramp regressor and the down-ramp regressor was greater for the 




















Fig. 8. Areas showing both a main effect of trial type (dots vs. arrows) and an interaction between trial type and 
ramp regressor type (up-ramp vs. down-ramp) in GLM parameter estimates. Numbers and colors indicate separate 
clusters, ordered by size, the parameter estimates of which are shown in Fig. 9. (Images are shown in the 
radiological view, with the left side of each image corresponding to the right side of the head, and with a five-slice 
gap between subsequent anatomical slices).	
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	 Name	 Voxels	 X	 Y	 Z	
1	 R	middle	occipital	gyrus	/	BA	19	 65	 -31.3	 79.4	 17.5	
2	 R	anterior	insula	 42	 -34.4	 -20.3	 3.7	
3	 L	cerebellum	(pyramis)	 31	 7.3	 68.0	 -25.0	
4	 L	middle	occipital	gyrus	/	BA	19	 31	 30.0	 84.1	 13.0	
5	 L	anterior	insula	 29	 33.8	 -19.0	 4.3	
6	 L	cerebellum	(culmen)	 19	 25.2	 56.6	 -23.2	
7	 L	cerebellum	(inferior	semi-lunar	lobule)	 11	 11.6	 62.6	 -42.2	
8	 R	caudate	 10	 -15.0	 6.6	 19.6	
9	 L	middle	occipital	gyrus	/	BA	19	 10	 23.4	 85.8	 24.7	
10	 L	inferior	temporal	gyrus	/	BA37	 8	 49.1	 64.5	 -3.5	
11	 L	fusiform	gyrus	 5	 27.9	 59.1	 -13.1	
12	 L	inferior	temporal	gyrus	/	BA37	 4	 41.2	 63.8	 -8.0	
13	 L	cerebellar	tonsil	 3	 23.5	 56.5	 -48.5	
14	 R	fusiform	gyrus	 3	 -27.5	 63.5	 -9.5	
Table 2. Areas showing both a main effect of trial type (dots vs. arrows) and an interaction between trial type and 





Fig. 9. Parameter estimates (beta-weights) for dots vs. arrows trials and up-ramp vs. down-ramp regressors. Each 
subplot shows the average beta-weight for a given cluster in Fig. 8, averaged across all participants with error-bars 
indicating the standard error of the mean. The number in parentheses indicates the number of voxels in a given 
cluster (cf. Table 2). P-values indicate the Bonferroni-corrected significance of the t-test on the interaction between 
trial type (dots vs. arrows) and regressor type (up-ramp vs. down-ramp).	
 
We also identified areas of the brain with greater activation during the dots task than the arrows 
task. These areas, while not necessarily accumulating evidence, are also involved in the decision 
making process in some way, but could reflect more general processes such as arousal and 
attention. Fig. S2 and Table S1 (Supplementary section) show areas for which a repeated 
measures ANOVA revealed larger activation during dots trials than during arrows trials (p < 
0.001, cluster size ≥	6). Fig. S3 (Supplementary section) shows the beta-weights for these areas 
that are not present in Fig. 9 but still have larger activity for dots than for arrow trials. By 
definition, in these regions dots trials show greater activation than arrows trials across ramp 
regressor types, irrespective of ramping. Fig. S3 (Supplementary section) shows the difference 
between beta-weights for up-ramp regressors and down-ramp regressors, for each trial type. Only 
a subset of these areas show an activation that is significantly greater for dots trials than arrows 
trials (indicated by Bonferroni-corrected p-values in each subplot). In those areas that are not 
significant, ramping activity is no greater during the decision making task than it is during the 
2. R insula (42)
p < 10 -5
3. L pyramis (31)
p < 10 -4
4. L mid occ gyr / BA19 (31)
p < 10 -4
6. L culmen (19)
p < 10 -4
7. L inf semi-lunar lob (11)
p < 0.001
8. R caudate (10)
p < 0.005
10. L inf temp gyr / BA37 (8)
p < 0.001
11. L fusiform gyr (5)
p < 0.001
12. L inf temp gyr / BA37 (4)
p < 0.001
dots arrows
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In this experiment we succeeded in dramatically prolonging the process of perceptual evidence 
accumulation to the 10-second range relative to the typically observed range of 300 msec to 2 
seconds. This was achieved by imposing stiff penalties for incorrect responses. Our analysis of 
the fMRI data leveraged GLM regressors designed to distinguish ramping activity from boxcar 
activity. We compared this ramping activity during a perceptual decision making task and during 
a control task that did not involve evidence accumulation of moving dots but matched the 
viewing time of dots. Using these methods we identified brain regions involved with perceptual 
evidence accumulation, which included bilateral anterior insula, cerebellum, caudate, left inferior 
temporal gyrus, fusiform gyrus, and middle occipital gyrus. 
 
Previous fMRI studies of evidence accumulation during decision making can be divided into 
several groups. In studies that approach decision making by focusing on areas where activity is 
modulated by the amount of decision evidence or the type of response effector, the brain regions 
implicated in evidence accumulation typically include the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, inferior 
parietal sulcus, and sometimes the anterior insula (Basten et al., 2010, Domenech & Dreher, 
2010, Fillimon et al., 2013, Heekeren et al., 2004, Noppeney et al, 2010, Tosoni et al., 2008). In 
studies in which decision evidence is revealed progressively over time, reports typically do not 
include the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (but see Gluth et al., 2012), but almost always the 
anterior insula, and sometimes inferior parietal sulcus as well (Gluth et al, 2012, Ivanoff et al., 
2008, Ploran et al., 2007, 2011). A potential problem with these previous studies of delaying 
decisions by gradually revealing a stimulus is that manipulating stimulus evidence is likely to 
affect a different level of cognitive processing (O’Connell, Dockree, & Kelly, 2012) while 
confounding perceptual detection with evidence accumulation. Thus, this type of manipulation 
may not selectively identify the neural integration process (Wheeler et al., 2015). Nevertheless, 
our observation of accumulator-like activity in the bilateral anterior insula is consistent with 
these previous studies.	
	
Ploran, Tremel, Nelson, and Wheeler (2011) attempted to avoid the confound between 
perceptual detection and evidence accumulation by maintaining a constant amount of perceptual 
information available. Every two seconds during each trial, a new pixelated mask appeared, 
which revealed the same area quantity but different parts of the object underneath. Although the 
visible surface area of the underlying object is constant, the visual information available to the 
participant is not; the stimulus information is static for two seconds at a time, and then changes 
discontinuously. This might lead to similarly nonlinear evidence accumulation. This approach 
may suffice in controlling for the perception/accumulation confound, though it precludes the use 
of simple, continuous stimuli. Tremel and Wheeler (2015) maintained a constant input of 
degraded images in a face/house recognition task, but RTs were not sufficiently long (around 3 
seconds) to measure ramping activity. Also, it is possible that face or object recognition is a 
nonlinear process and that revealing degraded images or masked local parts would interact with 
the accumulation process in a temporally unstable way.  In the future, it may be useful to directly 
compare these approaches with the methods we propose here of slowing down responding with 
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penalties, to further refine the ability to identify regions selectively associated with evidence 
accumulation. 
 
The brain regions that are associated with evidence accumulation also depend on the stimulus 
material used. For example, when decisions involve value judgments, the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex is reported (Gluth et al., 2012, Philiastides et al, 2010, Wheeler et al, 2014). In 
contrast, regions linked to stimulus perception, such as the middle occipital cortex and fusiform 
gyrus are also reported in various paradigms involving faces, objects, or randomly moving dots 
(Buchsbaum et al., 2013, Ploran et al., 2011, Tosoni et al., 2014, Wheeler et al., 2014). Finally, 
when decisions are based on memories, areas such as the hippocampus have been shown to be 
involved (Gluth et al., 2015; Mack & Preston, 2016).	
 
A previous debate in the literature on evidence accumulation during decision making has 
centered on the question of whether accumulation happens in effector regions, or whether there 
is effector-independent accumulation. Several studies (e.g., H. A. Heekeren et al., 2008; Ploran 
et al., 2007; Kayser, Erickson, Buchsbaum, & D’Esposito, 2010; Meyniel, Sergent, Rigoux, 
Daunizeau, & Pessiglione, 2013) showed that sensorimotor regions showed activity consistent 
with a role in evidence accumulation, but also effector-nonspecific areas may be involved (e.g., 
Ho, Brown, & Serences, 2009; Filimon, Philiastides, Nelson, Kloosterman, & Heekeren, 2013; 
Liu & Pleskac, 2011; Sestieri et al., 2014). Nevertheless, it may be the case that the distinction 
between pre-effector and post-effector stages is artificial (van Vugt, Simen, Nystrom, Holmes, & 
Cohen, 2014; Selen, Shadlen, & Wolpert, 2012), such that decisions are made through a 
continuous flow of information from regions more involved in perceptual information processing 
to regions more involved in motor processes. In our study, having successfully prolonged 
evidence accumulation to a degree that motor implementation takes up only a small part of the 
stimulus-to-response time, we do not observe accumulation in motor-related areas.	
 
Some have suggested that time on task is a confound (e.g. Buchsbaum, Erickson, and Kayser, 
2013; Grinband et al., 2011; Yarkoni, Barch, Gray, Conturo, and Braver, 2009). According to 
this argument, some brain activity may come from the passage of time, and not evidence 
accumulation per se. To avoid this potential confound, Buchsbaum, Erickson, and Kayser (2013) 
used a stop-signal design to dissociate time on task from evidence accumulation, and showed 
that more posterior perceptual regions were primarily associated with time on task, while more 
frontal regions such as preSMA and anterior insula were more correlated with the amount of 
actual evidence that was accumulated. In another design, Noppeney, Ostwald, and Werner 
(2010) argued that the inferior frontal sulcus showed characteristics consistent with evidence 
accumulation during a visual selective attention task with auditory distractors. This is consistent 
with our findings of accumulator-like activity in the bilateral anterior insula, although we do 
observe ramping activity also in more perceptual regions such as the middle occipital gyrus and 
the fusiform gyrus.	
	
Some of the original studies in monkeys using dot motion stimuli found a correlation between 
ramping activity in the lateral intraparietal cortex (area LIP; e.g. Shadlen & Newsome, 2001) 
which was interpreted as evidence that this area may drive perceptual decision making.  
Surprisingly, we failed to find ramping activity in this area in humans.  However, a recent study 
found that pharmacological inactivation of area LIP failed to have any impact on performance in 
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monkeys performing the same task (Katz, Yates, Pillow and Huk, 2016). Similar reports have 
been made by others (e.g., Balan & Gottlieb, 2009). These results call into question whether area 
LIP in monkeys plays a causal role in perceptual decisions. Similarly, activity in human area LIP 
may correlate with but not play a causal role in evidence accumulation. Our findings are 
consistent with this interpretation.  When we conducted an analysis to identify the main effect of 
a ramp (contrasting up-ramp against down-ramp activity) irrespective of condition (i.e., 
collapsing over experimental and control conditions), we identified large areas of the parietal 
cortex, including area LIP, which were not observed when we contrasted the two conditions.  
This suggests that ramping in LIP was a general characteristic of prolonged responding, and not 
directly related to the accumulation of evidence from the dot-motion stimuli in the experimental 
condition. 
 
It is important to note that our findings do not conclusively establish that participants in our task 
were accumulating evidence truly continuously. An alternative explanation could involve a 
sequence of different accumulation processes punctuated by moments when the participant 
deliberates about whether it is presently worthwhile to respond (Graziano, Polosecki, Shalom, & 
Sigman, 2011; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998). While our data were well fitted by a continuous 
evidence accumulation model, differing variants of integrator models are typically quite difficult 
to disentangle on a neural level (Ditterich, 2010).	
	
It is also worth noting that the results do not distinguish low coherence trials and high coherence 
trials. When coherence level is included in the model, there is no significant difference between 
the two (using the same significance thresholds as in our other results). One possible explanation 
is that while high coherence trials should have stronger accumulation signals (the BOLD signal 
rising more rapidly from baseline), the model fits might actually be weaker because high 
coherence trials entail shorter RTs on average, which implies less area under the curve and 
greater collinearity between regressors. Conversely, while low coherence trials should involve 
weaker accumulation signals in the brain, the model might actually fit BOLD accumulation 
signals better because there is less collinearity between regressors (because the RTs tend to be 
longer). This combination of stronger brain signals but worse model fits for high coherence 
trials, and vice versa for low coherence trials, may make it difficult to distinguish the two.	
	
While evidence accumulation is one potential source of ramping activity in perceptual decision 
tasks, other possible sources could be timing processes, motivational salience, urgency, and/or 
(potentially associated) increasing punishment-related anxiety. Without being able to distinguish 
low coherence and high coherence trials, it is difficult to rule these possibilities out. Cisek, 
Puskas & El-Murr (2009) suggest that ramping activity from perceptual input is a result of the 
multiplication of an urgency-to-respond signal with perceptual flows of information. With regard 
to timing, we have previously suggested that there is a tight link between timing and evidence 
accumulation (Simen et al., 2011; Balci & Simen, 2014; Simen, Vlasov & Papadakis, 2016), 
which may be amplified for the long time intervals used here. It is worth noting that among the 
fMRI studies of evidence accumulation, our study is one of a few (see also Ploran et al., 2007) 
demonstrating cerebellar activity consistent with evidence accumulation. As time progresses, the 
participant may be more and more inclined to press the button, because they know that in order 
to gain points, they need to perform as many trials as possible. However, the punishment on 
errors we introduced made it such that participants are relatively hesitant to commit to a 
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response. In fact, we observed that some participants found the task stressful because of this 
penalty and the associated anxiety. Activity in the anterior insula has previously been linked to 
the magnitude and likelihood of impending punishments (Ullsperger, Danielmeier, & Jocham, 
2014) and choice-related anxiety (Shenhav & Buckner, 2014), which is consistent with mounting 
activation in this region observed during the protracted decision process in our task. The 
representation of such motivationally significant information in anterior insula is thought to 
influence the allocation of control signals through the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) 
(Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Craig, 2009; Singer, Critchley, & Preuschoff, 2009; Medford & 
Critchley, 2010; Ullsperger, Harsay, Wessel, & Ridderinkhof, 2010; Shackman et al., 2011; 
Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013), and could be used by dACC to signal and/or adjust to 
conflict between responding and response inhibition (Wiecki & Frank, 2013).	
 
In summary, we introduced a new way to dramatically slow down decision making, thereby 
making evidence accumulation theoretically observable on the time scale of fMRI recordings. 
Using this method, we observed BOLD activity consistent with evidence accumulation for 
perceptual decisions in bilateral anterior insula, cerebellum, caudate, left inferior temporal gyrus, 
fusiform gyrus, and middle occipital gyrus. These findings challenge the interpretation of some 
areas previously associated with evidence accumulation in perceptual decision making, while  
identifying some new areas as candidates for involvement in evidence accumulation, integration, 
and/or closely related processes.  Future studies using these methods may help dissociate the 
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